In terms of both support and discourse the heart of Jair Bolsonaro’s Social Liberal Party lies in Rio de Janeiro. Here, aggressive messaging on rising crime and rampant corruption managed to turn a ragtag bunch of political misfits, former members of the security forces, and Bolsonaro associates into the epicentre of Brazil’s recent political earthquake. But as scandals around criminality and corruption begin to reach even the Bolsonaro family, these same strengths could soon become weaknesses if the Rio delegation and the wider PSL cannot pivot away from bombast and towards effective governance, write Mark S. Langevin (George Mason University) and Edmund Ruge in the second of a two-part series on the roots and the role of the Partido Liberal Social.
The same disruptive tactics that swept the PSL and Bolsonaro into power may also undermine their capacity to formulate and negotiate the president’s ambitious legislative agenda, write Mark S. Langevin (George Mason University) and Edmund Ruge in the first of a two-part series on the roots and the role of the Partido Liberal Social.
Jair Bolsonaro’s remarkable rise to the presidency has already caused a significant shake-up of Brazilian politics. But in the longer term, a looming fiscal catastrophe and sky-high expectations on crime and corruption could lead to political instability or even a constitutional crisis.
Jair Bolsonaro’s victory in Brazil’s 2018 presidential race and the wider success of his Social Liberal Party (PSL) serve to complete a remarkable political realignment in the country.
If the problems and potential of environmental licensing are not taken seriously in this year’s policy debates and electoral campaigns, future development and economic recovery could trigger environmental degradation far more serious than any single mega-dam project, write Mark S. Langevin and Olivia Smith. Since the Belo Monte debacle and with increasing private-sector interest in alternative renewables, Brazil’s energy authorities have begun to openly discount the future construction of mega-dam projects.
US – Upland Cotton (DS267), known as the cotton dispute, revealed the limits of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding and pitted US agricultural and trade policies against Brazil’s comparative advantages in cotton cultivation. More than any other case, this trade dispute exposed the underlying challenges to advancing the Doha Development Agenda. This article explores US compliance with the Dispute Settlement Body’s successive rulings from 2005 to 2009 by examining executive compliance efforts in the face of congressional foot dragging, and how such efforts shaped the evolution of this trade conflict and framed its resolution in October of 2014. The examination confirms the pivotal role that congress played in preventing full compliance, but also reveals the importance of executive administrative discretion, legislative advocacy, and trade policy orientation in determining the outcome of the cotton dispute and its eventual impact upon US global trade liberalization leadership, including the US government’s strategic withdrawal from the Doha round.